The Nuclear Danger in Asia

In recent years, significant attention has been focused rightly on the dangers posed by a three-way nuclear competition among China, Russia and the United States and the failure of those powers to engage in meaningful diplomacy to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race as required by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

At the same time, simmering tensions between nuclear-armed China and India and between India and Pakistan are driving a triangular nuclear arms race that has exacerbated the risks of nuclear escalation and missile proliferation.

At a December forum co-hosted by the Arms Control Association, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer said that Pakistan, which was granted “major non-NATO ally” status in 2004, is pursuing “increasingly sophisticated missile technology” that eventually could enable the country to “strike targets well beyond South Asia, including the United States.”

According to senior U.S. officials, Pakistan has sought for several years to increase the range and throw-weight capabilities of its medium-range ballistic missiles with help from entities in Belarus and China. They say Islamabad could have a long-range missile capability of greater than 3,000 kilometers (almost 2,000 miles) “within a decade.”

The officials said that Pakistan turned down U.S. proposals for confidence-building measures. They explained that new U.S. sanctions on a Pakistani state enterprise and commercial entities in Belarus and China are designed to slow the program.

In response, Pakistani officials called Finer’s comments “devoid of rationality” and said that their country “has never had any ill-intention towards the United States.” Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities “are solely meant to deter and thwart a clear and visible existential threat from our neighborhood,” they said.

But the notion that long-range missiles are needed to deter Pakistan’s neighbor and nuclear rival, India, is specious. Pakistan’s Shaheen-III ballistic missile, which was first tested in 2015 and has a range of 2,750 kilometers, already gives Pakistan the ability to strike any target in India.

With 170 plutonium-based nuclear warheads on short- and medium-range systems, Pakistan has enough nuclear firepower to deter a nuclear attack from India and obliterate much of the subcontinent. The country continues to produce fissile material and retains the option to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear military threats.

Since 2012, India has developed and tested the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is capable of delivering multiple warheads at a distance of 5,000 kilometers (about 3,000 miles) and puts all of China within range of a devastating nuclear attack. But unlike India, there is no coherent nuclear deterrence rationale for Pakistan, an ally of China, to possess long-range missiles. For these and other reasons, Finer said, “It is hard for us to see Pakistan’s actions as anything other than an emerging threat to the United States.”

The renewed U.S. attention to Pakistan’s advancing missile capabilities and targeted sanctions are warranted and overdue but insufficient. Over the years, Republican and Democratic administrations have been frustratingly inconsistent in their nonproliferation goals pertaining to India and Pakistan as they prioritized other aspects of bilateral relations. As a result, India continues steadily developing more advanced nuclear systems while Pakistan produces more fissile material and new missile capabilities in the name of “full spectrum deterrence” against India.

In response, leaders in Washington and other capitals need to implement a more comprehensive and balanced strategy based on the reality that the possession and buildup of nuclear weapons by any state, friend or foe, is a danger to international peace and security.

The new Trump administration should press forward with missile-related sanctions and engage with Pakistan regarding its long-range missile program. The administration also should press India to consider self-imposed limits on its ICBM capabilities, including a ban on multiple warhead missiles, which Pakistan may view as a threat to its nuclear retaliatory potential. The administration should work with other key governments to encourage Indian and Pakistani leaders to restart their moribund nuclear risk reduction and arms control dialogue.

Washington and its allies should also elevate global diplomatic efforts to bring into effect a long-sought halt in global fissile material production, which China and Pakistan have resisted for years. At the same time, the United States and Russia need to reach an interim deal not to expand their own strategic nuclear forces following the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2026. Failure to do so would undermine U.S. calls for restraint by others and give China further motivation to increase its ICBM force, which in turn would stimulate Indian and Pakistani missile advances.

At this point, Pakistan seems determined to proceed with its long-range missile program. But with time, sustained, serious dialogue and a more balanced approach, the next administration may find opportunities to reduce nuclear and missile threats in Asia that so far have eluded U.S. policymakers.